1. SURELY SAYING that one must accept the rationalist way of life on an act of faith, or basing an argument for accepting the rationalist way of life on the acceptance of that way of life, is not being rational about rationalism. If it is true that any argument for the adoption of (comprehensive) rationalism must presuppose rationalism, then it seems that the only alternative is to adopt rationalism irrationally. 1 W. W. Bartley 2 has argued that it is not the only alternative. One can adopt rationalism critically. However, J. W. N. Watkins recently argued for the thesis that it is logically impossible for Bartley's comprehensively critical rationalist to be rational about his rationalism:
Bartley's claim that CCR is criticisable will be reinforced by every .^attempt to refute it. Is it a shade ironical that a position presented aŝ the ne plus ultra in intellectual anti-authoritarianism should turn out to have this 'dictatorial' or 'dogmatic' character, contrary to the author's intentions. 2. 'One can be rational about rationalism' is a belief. If one can be rational about one's beliefs, then one can be rational about one's belief that one can be rational about rationalism. However, being rational about the belief, 'one can be rational about rationalism', is not a sufficient condition for being rational about rationalism. The point is that being rational about rationalism does not consist in being rational about a belief, nor about all one's beliefs. Rationalism consists in being rational about one's beliefs, whatever their content. Being rational about rationalism consists in holding and/or adopting rationalism rationally.
If I am not rational about my belief that I can be rational about rationalism, then I am not a consistent rationalist. On the other hand, if I am rational about my belief that I can be rational about rationalism, I still may not be rational about rationalism. If one argues that no rationalist can be rational about his belief that he can be rational about his rationalism, he reveals that a rationalist cannot be consistent. But he does not reveal that a rationalist cannot be rational about his rationalism. If it is impossible to be rational about all one's beliefs, it is still possible to be rational about rationalism. However, does he even reveal that a rationalist cannot be consistent ? For is it not irrational to demand of anyone that he do the logically impossible ? And if in fact it is logically impossible to be rational about the belief that one can be rational about rationalism, then a rationalist is consistent in not being rational about that belief. A rationalist can only be inconsistent if he is not rational about what he can logically be rational.
3. 'Rationalists are not rational about their rationalism', does not necessarily imply 'rationalists are irrational about their rationalism'. For, if it is logically impossible to be rational about rationalism, and assuming that it is irrational to attempt to do the logically impossible, then it is irrational for a rationalist to attempt to be rational about his rationalism. Moreover, if it is irrational for a rationalist to attempt to be rational about his rationalism, then in not attempting to be rational about his rationalism, he is being rational. 54 J 4. If Watkins is correct about Comprehensively Critical Rationalism, that every attempt to criticise it reinforces it, then he is correct in claiming that it is logically impossible for a comprehensively critical rationalist to be rational about his rationalism. If it is logically impossible for a comprehensively critical rationalist, or for that matter a comprehensive rationalist, to be rational about his rationalism, then it is irrational for him to attempt to be rational about his rationalism.
So, in not being rational about rationalism, the comprehensive and the comprehensively critical rationalist are being rational. Only if it is logically possible to be rational about rationalism, can one be irrational, in not being rational about rationalism.
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•Rationalism, as opposed to irrationalism, rather than empiricism. 
